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JOAN B. KROC INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & JUSTICE
The mission of the Joan B.
Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
(IPJ) is to foster peace, cultivate
justice and create a safer world.
Through education, research and
peacemaking activities, the IPJ offers
programs that advance scholarship
and practice in conflict resolution
and human rights. The Institute
for Peace & Justice, located at the
University of San Diego, draws
upon Catholic social teaching that
sees peace as inseparable from
justice and acts to prevent and
resolve conflicts that threaten local,
national and international peace.
The IPJ was established in 2000
through a generous gift from the late Joan B. Kroc to the University of
San Diego to create an institute for the study and practice of peace and
justice. Programming began in early 2001 and the building was dedicated in
December 2001 with a conference, “Peacemaking with Justice: Policy for the
21st Century.”

world to document their stories, share experiences with others working in
peacemaking, and allow time for reflection on their work.
A Master’s Program in Peace & Justice Studies trains future leaders in
the field and will be expanded into the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies,
supported by a $50 million endowment from the estate of Mrs. Kroc.
WorldLink, a year-round educational program for high school students
from San Diego and Baja California connects youth to global affairs.
Country programs, such as the Nepal project, offer wide-ranging conflict
assessments, mediation and conflict resolution training workshops.
Community outreach includes speakers, films, art and opportunities for
discussion between community members, academics and practitioners on issues
of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international
leaders in government, non-governmental organizations and the military.

The Institute for Peace & Justice strives, in Joan B. Kroc’s words, to “not
only talk about peace, but to make peace.” The IPJ offers its services to parties
in conflict to provide mediation and facilitation, assessments, training and
consultations. It advances peace with justice through work with members of
civil society in zones of conflict and has a focus on mainstreaming women in
peace processes.
The Women PeaceMakers Program brings into residence at the IPJ women
who have been actively engaged in peacemaking in conflict areas around the
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JOAN B. KROC DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES
Endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for
Peace & Justice from the late Joan Kroc, philanthropist and international
peace proponent, the Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum for
high-level national and international leaders and policy makers to share their
knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. The goal of
the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve conflict
and promote peace with justice.
The Distinguished Lecture Series offers the community at large an
opportunity to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues
with parties in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create
an enduring peace for tomorrow. The series, which is held at the Joan B. Kroc
Institute for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego, examines new
developments in the search for effective tools to prevent and resolve conflict
while protecting human rights and ensuring social justice.
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DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES SPEAKERS
April 15, 2003

Robert Edgar, Ph.D.
General Secretary, National Council of Churches
The Role of the Church in U.S. Foreign Policy

May 8, 2003

Helen Caldicott, M.D.
President, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
The New Nuclear Danger

October 15, 2003 Richard J. Goldstone
Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
The Role of International Law in Preventing Deadly Conflict

January 14, 2004

April 14, 2004

November 17, 2004 Noeleen Heyzer, Ph.D.
Executive Director – United Nations Development
Fund for Women
Women, War and Peace: Mobilizing for Security
and Justice in the 21st Century

February 10, 2005 The Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Ph.D.
President, University of Winnipeg
The Responsibility to Protect: Prescription for a Global Public Domain

March 31, 2005

Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg
U.S. Department of State
Conflict, Gender and Human Rights: Lessons Learned from the Field

General Anthony C. Zinni
United States Marine Corps (retired)
From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table:
Preventing Deadly Conflict

October 27, 2005 His Excellency Ketumile Masire
Former President of the Republic of Botswana
Perspectives into the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Contemporary Peacebuilding Efforts

January 27, 2006
November 4, 2004 Hanan Ashrawi, Ph.D.
Secretary General – Palestinian Initiative for the
Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
Concept, Context and Process in Peacemaking:
The Palestinian-Israeli Experience
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Mary Robinson
Former President of Ireland and United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights
Human Rights and Ethical Globalization

Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
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BIOGRAPHY OF AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER
R. HILL
Christopher R. Hill was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs on April 8, 2005.
Ambassador Hill is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service whose
most recent assignment was as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. On
February 14, 2005, he was named as the Head of the U.S. delegation to the
Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Previously he has served
as U.S. Ambassador to Poland (2000-2004), Ambassador to the Republic
of Macedonia (1996-1999) and Special Envoy to Kosovo (1998-1999).
He also served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Southeast European Affairs in the National Security Council.
Earlier in his Foreign Service career, Ambassador Hill served tours in
Belgrade, Warsaw, Seoul and Tirana, and on the Department of State’s
Policy Planning staff and in the Department’s Operation Center. While on
a fellowship with the American Political Science Association he served as a
staff member for Congressman Stephen Solarz working on Eastern European
issues. He also served as the Department of State’s Senior Country Officer
for Poland. Ambassador Hill received the State Department’s Distinguished
Service Award for his contributions as a member of the U.S. negotiating team
in the Bosnia peace settlement, and was a recipient of the Robert S. Frasure
Award for Peace Negotiations for his work on the Kosovo crisis. Prior
to joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Hill served as a Peace Corps
volunteer in Cameroon.

USD President Mary Lyons (left) with Patricia Whitelaw-Hill and Ambassador Hill.

Ambassador Hill graduated from Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine
with a B.A. in Economics. He received a Master’s degree from the Naval
War College in 1994. He speaks Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian and
Albanian. Ambassador Hill is married and has three children.
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INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL
The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Ambassador
Christopher Hill, conducted by Susan Shirk1 on January 27, 2006 at the Joan
B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice.
CH: Christopher Hill
SS: Susan Shirk

SS: Oh, that’s great, that’s great. So your dad is still alive. Was he proud?
CH: Yes, I think he was pleased about it. So basically my career has been: I
went off to the Balkans, then I went to Poland, then I went to Seoul, Korea
in the mid-‘80s.
SS: As a political officer?

SS: When you were a kid, what did you think you were going to be when
you grew up? Did you think you were going to be a peacemaker?
CH: I wanted to play second base for the Boston Red Sox.
SS: Wow, so it’s been a big disappointment to you.
CH: When that didn’t work out, I had to look at other things. I went off to
the Peace Corps, and while I was in the Peace Corps, I took the Foreign Service
Exam. After the Peace Corps, I did two more months in Africa as a contractor
for AID [U.S. Agency for International Development], and then I got a call
from the Foreign Service inviting me in. I started off having had only one job,
and that was in the Peace Corps.
SS: So you’ve really been in the Foreign Service your whole life and you’ve
served in a lot of different places, but a lot of time in the Balkans, right?
CH: That’s right. And that does go back to my childhood because my dad was
a Foreign Service officer. I first went to Belgrade when I was five years old, six,
seven, and left when I was eight years old. My first assignment in the Foreign
Service by, sort of, wild happenstance was back to Belgrade. So that was kind
of neat—I met my second grade teacher there.

CH: As an economic officer. Then I went back to the Balkans during the
1990s, and then back to Poland from 2000 to 2004, and then back to Korea.
Two laps around the track.
SS: Well, the Balkans are so complicated that they’ve given their name to
a verb. I’m wondering how the Korean problem looks in comparison to the
Balkan problems.
CH: The Balkans are complicated, and I think a lot of problems are
complicated, but that doesn’t mean they’re impossible to understand, and that
doesn’t mean that they’re necessarily things that are intractable. But you do
need to ask yourself the question, why does something happen? You have to
be kind of respectful of the situation, and when you see a situation, it’s not
usually just one factor that has caused the situation: it’s a whole bunch of
things. When you start to intervene and start to look at ways to come out with
a different outcome, I just think you have to be respectful of how it got there
and you have to be a little modest about your ability to change it.
SS: In the case of Korea right now, you’re engaged in what many people
think is one of the most difficult tasks of trying to convince North Korea
to give up its nuclear program. What do you see as the biggest challenge
in that task?

1 Susan Shirk is Professor of Political Science in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies,
University of California, San Diego and Research Director at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
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CH: Well, first of all, Korea is one of the great tragedies of the mid-20th
century, and certainly any Korean who talks about the peninsula feels this
sense of tragedy. And to some extent among Koreans, there’s a feeling that
somehow their country, their lands, were divided during a period of great
weakness for them. So it’s kind of understandable that often they look outside
for the reason why their nation, their peninsula, was divided. It’s a source of
really deep-seated anxiety, and I suspect that that anxiety extends to people in
North Korea. I mean, anyone who has seen the scenes of family unification,
as I did when I first got there in ’85—a searing image, I mean, you can never
forget seeing families unified, in that case by the Red Cross in 1985, for the
first time—knows it’s a very emotional issue. We need to respect the emotion
of the issue. As we approach it, we have to understand that we’re not going to
be able to see this in an identical way as the South Koreans are going to see
it, and certainly from the point of view of the North Koreans, it’s a whole
other world. So it’s a very complex, psychological problem, quite apart from
the geopolitics of it.
SS: You think this aspiration for reunification is a big part of the subtext
of the problem?
CH: And I would emphasize subtext. I think people look at this in different
slices of their consciences. I think for many South Koreans, they’ve looked at
the economic magnitude of what North Korea, at their doorstep or in their
lap, would mean in terms of paying for it.
SS: They’re not too eager to do that.
CH: Exactly. If you look at the West German experience with East Germany—
by the way, that’s something the South Koreans have studied to death; I mean,
they send whole delegations over there all the time—it was enormous, and it
is still a tremendous burden to Germany. I think the South Koreans are very
aware of that. They have a per capita income some thirty times more than the
North Koreans, and the idea of absorbing 20 million people with that kind
of per capita income is very frightening.
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SS: So that’s a contradiction.
CH: That’s a contradiction. Absolutely. But that said, the Koreans really feel
that they have the right to determine how they want to live, whether it’s in a
confederal arrangement or more likely, an eventual unification, they feel it’s
their job, their decision. We, on the other hand, have a particular issue in
North Korea, which is the development of these nuclear weapons—by the way,
these nuclear weapons have been developed for 20, 30 years; this didn’t just
start with the Bush administration.
SS: The 1980s.
CH: Exactly. We have to be very concerned about this. We have to be concerned
about what North Korean nuclear weapons could mean to the region; we have
to be concerned about what they could mean for proliferation elsewhere. And
those are issues—the nuclear issue and some of the other issues, ballistic
missiles, etc.—these are issues that go beyond the peninsula. That’s where we
have to kind of work things out with the South Koreans.
SS: This Six-Party Talk format is a pretty novel experience for the
Americans, although in several of these Balkan negotiations you’ve been
involved in, you always had partners. Do you want to say a little something
about the dynamics of trying to coordinate among the five as to how to
move forward?
CH: Well, there are advantages and disadvantages obviously. I do believe the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages, but it doesn’t mean that it’s easy. Often
what you’re doing, in regard to the contact group in the Balkans, for example,
often the negotiation was not so much between us and one of the warring
factions, or the three warring factions which was the case in Bosnia, but it was
negotiations between us and the other Europeans. But we understood that the
Europeans brought a lot to the table. They brought a lot to the table in terms
of what they were prepared to do economically—they’ve got these countries on
their feet; they brought a lot to the table in terms of what they were prepared
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to do institutionally to bring these countries eventually into the European
Union. So the notion of a U.S. negotiation with these warring factions, in my
view, would not have solved the problem, or created the platform to stabilize
or to have a solid framework for the future. We needed them, but often it was
kind of difficult to negotiate because we had different perspectives on it. The
French were sometimes more solicitous of the Serb position than others were;
the Germans were sometimes more solicitous of the Croat position than others
were; in fact, I would say the burden of history weighed very much on a lot
of the participants.
SS: By “burden of history” you mean old grudges?
CH: Old grudges and old alliances. It was not an impossible thing to understand,
but Americans needed to spend a little time understanding it. Sometimes
Americans consider history as what happened last Tuesday, and that’s not going
to do. So we had to understand that. I think as we move to Korea, this, too, is
not an American problem, this is a problem for the whole region. I mean, if
North Korea is allowed to keep its nuclear weapons, what is going to happen in
Japan? I’d like to think they would not go nuclear, but what is going to happen?
I can’t answer that. What is going to happen in South Korea? I mean, what does
this do to the region? So we need the participation of the neighbors, but I
think we also need to understand that everybody has a different perspective on
North Korea. I mean, the Chinese have a very complex picture when they look
at North Korea: they see an ally, they see a country where the communist party
in North Korea has a long history with the communist party in China—what
would that mean if you don’t have a communist party in North Korea? What
would that do to the kind of relationships? How does that affect China’s civil
military relationships within China? The military in China has had relations
with the military in North Korea. It’s complicated stuff. It’s something you’ve
got to figure out if you’re going to make progress.

countries you’re trying to work with; and then you’ve got the target country,
in this case, North Korea.
CH: That’s right. Three levels or a three-ring circus. I mean, basically your best
diplomacy should start at home. You’ve got to work the inter-agency process.
You’ve got to make sure that if you’re the negotiator that the other agencies feel
comfortable, otherwise you’re going to have problems back at home. And when
you have problems at home, you can’t do your job abroad.
SS: Do you think that American negotiators, not just in the North Korea
situation, but typically, are delegated more discretion than negotiators from
other countries?
CH: It’s hard to say. It kind of depends. I’ve been in negotiations when my boss
back in Washington just says, “Do the best you can. You’re going to get credit
for trying in this one.” And then I’ve had negotiations where I feel like I have
some sort of helmet cam on where they want to tell me every little block and
every move I’m supposed to make on the field. To be sure, you have people that
want real time updates by telephone; then you have people who say, “Hey, we
trust you. Just go out and get it done. Phone in when you need help.” So it is
very important that you have a good relationship with people in Washington.
SS: Now, in the case of the Kosovo negotiation, the threat of force—
American use of force—was very important to get Milosevic and the Serbs
to finally agree. And we had to not just threaten, but actually use force. In
the case of Korea, back in ’94, there was a real threat to use force. It doesn’t
appear that there is one right now. Is that a problem? Does that make things
more difficult?

SS: Actually, if you think about it, it’s kind of like three levels of
negotiations, starting with the domestic ones to get everybody on the same
page within our own government; then you’ve got the one with the other

CH: Usually you want a threat of force in order to prevent having to use force.
So the best threat we had was in Kosovo and alas, that was the one place where
we really had to use it. In short, in Kosovo—I keep saying the problems were
more complex—basically Milosevic was not going to give up Kosovo without a
fight. Whether you threaten it or didn’t threaten it, ultimately, you’re probably
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going to have to use force because of the relationship of the average Serb
peasant to Kosovo. But in terms of those three issues, I think you have to look
at also the stage of war termination. In Bosnia, the war had been going on for
some time, and there was certainly a sense that the parties were ready.
SS: Weariness. Exhaustion.
CH: Yes, they were weary and ready for a settlement. So in Bosnia—and my
friend, Dick Holbrooke,2 would not like to hear me say this—but in Bosnia, I
always felt we were absolutely going to get a deal. In Kosovo, given that it had
been a pretty low intensity—and I would argue also a low-IQ—warfare there
was no real sense of exhaustion or weariness.
SS: They still had a lot in them.
CH: They had a lot of fight in them. I just did not believe we were going to get
there because I could understand what we could offer the Albanians; I couldn’t
figure out what we could offer Serbia. For example, given that Milosevic was
in power, it was not viable to say to the Serbs that you can choose between
Kosovo and the European Union, for example, European Union membership,
because European Union membership was not on the table.
SS: So no carrots for Milosevic?
CH: I just couldn’t see what we had to offer him, apart from him giving up a
part of what Serbs consider the heart of Serbia: to ask Milosevic to do that
was to ask him to cut his entire political base out from under him and he
wasn’t prepared to do that. So in Kosovo, I really had the sense that we were
not going to get there. Bosnia, I thought we’d get there; Kosovo, I thought we
would not get there. And in Korea, I just don’t know. And the reason I don’t
know is I don’t understand what is going on in the minds of the North Korean
leadership. I do know that if you rank in order the top one hundred problems
2 Richard Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs during the conflict in
Bosnia. He helped lead the negotiations that resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords which ended the war in the former
Yugoslavia.
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in North Korea, nuclear weapons aren’t going to solve any of them. I do
know that the weapons program they have in North Korea is something they
thought—that many North Koreans feel—is a great symbol of strength, but
actually it’s been quite a weight on their shoulders and has really done a lot of
damage to that country. So the logic of it is to get out of this thing and get a
good price and get out of this mess. Fundamentally, I don’t know if what we
have on offer is what they want, really want.
SS: A lot of people believe that North Korea genuinely feels threatened by
the United States, although it’s always very hard for us to understand how
that could be. They often argue that our action in Iraq made them feel
even more threatened, although of course the nuclear program started a
long time ago. When you’re dealing with the North Koreans, do you think
that’s a genuine feeling, or is that just something that’s a good excuse, or
just a negotiating tactic?
CH: Well, whether they feel threatened by us or not, this weapons program has
been going on for 25 years. I don’t quite understand that if they feel threatened
by us, what nuclear weapons are going to do about it.
SS: Because they’re more threatened if they have them.
CH: Exactly. I don’t quite understand the dynamics. If they’re worried that
we’re going to attack them, then what? Are they going to attack one of their
neighbors with nuclear weapons? Realistically speaking, I don’t think they can
fire off nuclear weapons at anybody. The notion that these are some sort of
ultimate defensive weapon for North Korea I don’t quite buy. I think if they
really were concerned about the U.S. threat, they’d try to reach a settlement
with us, and they know a settlement is quite possible with us.
SS: Is it easy for us to convince them that we’re not a threat and that we
are ready to have a normal relationship with them? Isn’t that a challenge?
And then on the other hand, isn’t it a challenge for them to convince us
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that they really are willing to denuclearize after this long period of trying
to develop weapons and cheating on the agreements?

going to have troubles keeping that going. But it’s unclear what benefit they
can get from nuclear weapons.

CH: They’ve been at it for 25 years, and so to expect them to give up these
weapons, it would be a very big step. They’ve agreed in principle to do it, and
it was encouraging in September; in the Beijing agreement3 they agreed in
principle. But clearly these weapons have been something that they’ve spent a
lot of money on, precious resources on, so it would obviously be a big step
to get rid of these weapons. But the notion that they’re being an ultimate
defense against a U.S. attack, really, I just don’t think stands up under scrutiny
because if they were really worried about us attacking them, they would have
been interested in a negotiation a long time ago: CBMs [confidence building
measures], some de-confliction of forces in the DMZ, the demilitarized zone
area. And they’ve never shown much of an interest in that sort of thing. On the
contrary, they’ve been really quite hostile during these two and a half decades.

SS: In this case, do you see that the carrot is big enough?

SS: Certainly we know a lot less about North Korea than the other countries
you were dealing with in the other negotiations, so that uncertainty must
make things very difficult.
CH: I’m sure to some extent the North Koreans regard their own opaqueness
as some sort of strength: by being hard to figure out that gives them some sort
of advantage. I can imagine a sense of paranoia looking around the world and
seeing the number of natural allies they might have decreasing and decreasing,
but that’s not a reason to get nuclear weapons, that’s a reason to change your
ways.
SS: But of course their conventional forces are much weaker than they were.
They’re so poor.
CH: They’re so poor and they have difficulties modernizing, so I agree, they’re
3 The Beijing agreement, signed on 19 September 2005, was the result of the Six-Party Talks, of which Ambassador
Hill led the American team. He discusses the process of the talks further in his lecture.

20

CH: I think that what we’ve got on offer, if they’re interested in developing
their country, would be very attractive. There’s no question it would be a road
toward a much brighter future, and with a multilateral agreement—I think
it’s the multilateral agreement that gives them the sense of security that some
people say they need. I think it’s just a very fundamental question for them
about giving up a weapons system whose purpose is to give them prestige that
they otherwise do not get.
SS: Talk a little bit about the relationship between the United States and
South Korea. South Korea is our ally and we fought alongside South Korea,
and yet, public opinion in Korea is now as critical of the United States as
it is in a lot of other countries. So is this just the casualty of the backlash
against Iraq or is there more to it than that, and is that making a problem
for our efforts vis a vis North Korea?
CH: First of all, I’m very optimistic about our relationship with South
Korea. I think we can have a really excellent relationship with that country. I
think from South Korea’s strategic point of view—they lie between two great
powers in Japan and China—and from their strategic point of view, it seems
to me to make a lot of sense that they maintain a relationship with a distant
power. I think a strong U.S. relationship is a good thing for South Korea, and
I think many South Koreans—if you look at the polling data—believe in
that. By polling data I’m referring to when the public is asked about the views
of the U.S. alliance. Now that said, it’s a different South Korea. It’s not your
father’s South Korea. It’s a different country. I think we need to understand
that. There’s definitely been a generational shift there. There’s also been a
tremendous democratic shift there and the country is truly a democracy. I
think rather than wring our hands about that, we should celebrate that fact.
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Now to be sure, South Korea is a bit of a red-blue situation going on: you ask
two South Koreans something, you’ll get three different answers. To some extent
there’s some polarization, but there’s just a lot of “opinionization.” People are
very political there; they have really lively newspapers, both left and right; and I
think we just need to understand that. Now I must say, when I hear people talk
about the good old days, I remember the good old days as not being so good. I
remember lots of problems dealing with the South Koreans, so I’m not sure we
were always on the same page with the South Koreans. I remember being there
in 1985 during the Chun Doo-hwan government and that was no fun for our
relationship. So I’m not sure it was ever that easy, and certainly now there are
challenges, and certainly we have to approach things differently and work with
them, but I’m a real optimist about our relations there.
SS: The number of South Koreans studying Chinese is huge now, and the
economic relationship and the political relationship, but even the strategic
relationship, between South Korea and China has really developed very
fast. How do you see that? Do you think that’s a natural thing and is that
compatible with the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance?
CH: I think it’s very natural and I think it’s totally understandable when you
consider how historically close the Koreans have been to the Chinese people—
to China rather—and the artificial barrier that existed for some 40 years, so I
think it was entirely natural that once relations were re-established, there was a
lot of Korean interest in China. But, you know, Koreans still comprise one of
the largest student populations in the U.S.; there is still a great deal of English
spoken in Korea, and I have no doubt that English remains the number one
language of anyone who wants to learn a foreign language there. So the fact
that Korea has a greatly improved relationship with China, I think is very much
in our interest and Korea’s interest and, frankly, in China’s interest. It doesn’t
bother me at all.

being the Chinese and the South Koreans, and the Russians not being
terribly active one way or the other?
CH: On January 27th, the Japanese are announcing their schedule for their
upcoming bilateral talks with the North Koreans. I think you’re going to see
a lot of effort by the Japanese to make some progress in that channel. Rather
than look at it in hard-line and soft-line, I’d rather look at it as those who see
this as a long-term proposition and something that’s going to take many years,
versus other countries that are more concerned with making progress quickly.
Our concern is clearly on the nuclear side. We have no confidence really in the
North Koreans not proliferating; we’ve seen them out there selling all kinds
of strange things to strange people. So the notion that they would never do
this—it’s interesting, they would not put in any anti-proliferation features in
the agreement because they wanted to get some compensating measures for
it. I think we have some very legitimate, real concerns about proliferation.
I sometimes think that countries that are so close to North Korea and see
all the other stuff maybe don’t spend enough time being worried about the
proliferation.
SS: Let me ask you one last question. In the Balkan negotiations, it seems
to me that in most of them, the negotiators would go some place and they’d
stay there for a long time until they made some progress. They negotiated
for extended periods, and certainly that’s the way arms control negotiations
in Geneva have always been. How do you feel about this episodic—a few
days this month and wait another three months—approach as you are doing
in the Six-Party Talks? Is it going to work?

SS: Do you see two camps in the Six-Party Talks: the harder camp and the
softer camp—the harder camp being the U.S. and Japan, the softer camp

CH: Earlier in the first three rounds in the Six-Party Talks, they just did these
three-and-out negotiations: three days and then they were done. In the fourth
round, it was my strong view, which I really worked closely with my South
Korean and Japanese counterparts on, that once we got them to the table, we
shouldn’t just let them go after three days—we ought to keep them there. And
we did. We made a lot of progress, I thought.
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SS: It was six or seven days?
CH: No, it was more like 11 days and nights. When it was clear the North
Koreans needed guidance from North Korea, and it was clear we weren’t going
to get there unless they got home for a recess, we agreed to a recess, but we
also said they had to come back in September, where we spent another eight
days maybe. We stayed a long time until we got something. And that was a
departure from the previous three days and out. It’s very clear that the DPRK
[Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] negotiators go with fairly limited
discretion. But the issue was to really stick with it until we got something,
and we did. We would have done more of that just before, in the beginning
of the fifth round in November, but we had APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] coming up, and frankly speaking, countries weren’t quite ready
to put forward comprehensive programs, implementation programs. I hope
that when we get going again it won’t be three days, but we’ll stay until we get
something.
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INTRODUCTION BY MR. ROBERT HOEHN, CHAIR OF
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
SAN DIEGO
Petrified is what I would be if my
college roommate were introducing
me. However, Chris, my wife has put
me under threat of major duress that
only a husband could understand, so
I am going to be nice.

know whether it was the insular environment I grew up in in Tennessee, but
this was really novel to me.

Chris and I met, I would guess,
the first day we both entered Bowdoin
[College]. We lived across the hall
from one another. I think Chris’
sophomore year, he took a year at
Smith. I could never understand why
anybody would want to go to an allgirls’ school for an exchange year, but
nevertheless, Chris decided it might
be a good idea. By senior year, Chris
and I and these two other gentlemen
roomed together in 11B in the senior
center at Bowdoin College. Well, we
spent a lot of time—I know this is a topical point here at the university—in
the student center, especially late at night, I mean, we would brave sub-zero
temperatures to go have, as I recall, this rather large chocolate chip cookie.
Bob and Ted and I would mostly discuss when our next date was going to
be; actually, if there was going to be another date. Chris—not that he was
immune to the social ills of Bowdoin—could often be found in discussion
with a professor, whose name I could not pronounce, from a country I was
clueless on the map where it was, about a situation I had never heard of. My
earliest memories of Chris were his interests in foreign policy, and I do not
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Now, one thing which is not in Chris’ bio that I am sure he would want me
to say is that he was a lacrosse star at Bowdoin. I think our senior year we were
New England champs or something. Another thing that is not in his bio is that
to this day, I cannot listen to John Denver without thinking of Chris wailing
out “Rocky Mountain High” on his guitar—crooning out “Rocky Mountain
High.”
Upon graduation, Chris went to the Peace Corps, and went to Cameroon.
Fortunately for Chris, he met his wife, Patty, there. And I wish I could tell my
younger daughter, who is interested in the Foreign Service, that immediately
after the Peace Corps, Chris became an ambassador. But, alas, that is not quite
the case. Now forgive me, but I am going to read a little bit from this official
bio: on February 14 of 2005, Chris was named as head of the U.S. delegation
to the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. He has previously
served as the U.S. Ambassador to Poland, the Ambassador to the Republic
of Macedonia, and Special Envoy to Kosovo. He has received the State
Department’s Distinguished Service Award for his contributions as a member
of the U.S. negotiating team in Bosnia, and was a recipient of the Robert S.
Frasure Award for Peace Negotiations for his work on the Kosovo crisis.
I think I should say a little side note here: my family and I were fortunate
enough to visit Patty and Chris in Warsaw during his ambassadorship there,
and I have to say, I was concerned because there were two things that bothered
me. First of all, Chris beat me in ping pong, which I never recall him doing
at Bowdoin; and secondly, I saw that he speaks Polish, Serbo-Croatian,
Macedonian, and Albanian. I was trying to reconcile this with the Chris I knew
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at college, and I was really concerned there might be some kind of nefarious
identity theft going on here, but I do feel comfortable at this point that this
really is indeed Chris Hill.
Chris and Patty have three children: Clara, Amy and Nat. Clara is doing
a post-graduate year in Poland at the moment. Amy is at Wellesley [College].
And Nat is with defense intelligence outside of Washington, kind of keeping
it in the family. Anyway, Chris has done 11B from Bowdoin College very
proud, and I am delighted to introduce to you Ambassador Chris Hill.

U.S. Policy in East Asia
and the Paciﬁc

Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
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Thank you, I think I need to take some more blood pressure medication.
No, that was OK, that was good, Bob. I just was not sure what was coming next,
but it was good, it was fine. Anyway, it is great to be here, it is great to be out
of Washington. I really enjoy that airport—you know, we were landing, and I
saw these buildings on the left and buildings on the right, and I thought, “My
God, we are going to park the airplane in a parking lot.” But, I cannot wait to
do that again: knuckles are turning pink again. It was exciting.
It is truly great to be here to the University of San Diego. I know how
engaged this college, this university, is on some of the issues that are dear to my
heart—although not when I was in 11B; I think I talked mainly about lacrosse
back then, with a minor in frisbee. I really am so pleased to see the interest in
foreign affairs, the interest in international relations, and the interest in the
study of peace and justice because I really think that our country faces a lot
of problems out there in the world, and I think it is very important we have
people trained to deal with those problems. Those problems are not going to
go away; in fact, they are going to become more and more numerous and we
have got to deal with them. And we are not going to be able to deal with them
by sending our military to each and every one of those problems because there
are too many for our military to handle, and besides that, we need to use our
military for situations where only the military can take care of the problem. I
am sort of an old-fashioned guy, I think we ought to try to see what we can
do diplomatically, and I think we need to gear up a generation of Americans
capable of doing that, so I really applaud what the Institute here is doing, what
the University here is doing. I really feel very positive about it.
I am going to talk a little about U.S. relations in an area of the world
that I think is pretty important to us because for something like two centuries,
people have been predicting “the century of Asia,” and now, I think, in this
21st century—ready or not—it is here. There is no part of the globe that holds
more benefits and challenges for the United States than the East Asia/Pacific
area. It is home to some of our most stalwart security and trade partners. It is
home to China, and China is rapidly assuming a prominent place in the global
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stage. It is far and away our most important relationship in the world. The
region of East Asia/Pacific counts for nearly a third of the earth’s population,
25 percent of the global GDP, some 27 percent of our exports, 37 percent of
our agricultural exports—in all, some $750 billion in two-way trade with the
U.S. In every regard—geographically, geopolitically, militarily, diplomatically,
economically and commercially—East Asia is vital to the national security
interests of the United States. We have to be out there, we have to be dealing
with those situations, we have to be dealing with the challenges there.

There is no part of the globe that holds
more benefits and challenges for the United States
than the East Asia/Pacific area.

To be sure, there are some very favorable trends out there in East Asia/
Pacific. Democracy is very much on the march. We have had successful elections
in countries that never dreamed they could have elections in any event, let alone
successful ones. We have had successful elections in countries like Mongolia, in
South Korea, in Taiwan—just a few years ago, the idea of free and fair elections
was unheard of, and yet those countries have done extremely well. Thailand is
coming along with that. And of course, we have some very old and very good
partners, including Japan and Australia. Prosperity is growing in the region. It
is fueled by China’s rapid development. You know, for years and years, decades
and decades, we looked for a second engine of development: there was the U.S.
and who else? And now we have that second engine of development: it is called
China. So China has really helped bring up those countries in the world. We
see the recovery among the Southeast Asian states, the ASEAN [Association
of Southeast Asian Nations] states, after the financial crisis of 1997. These
economies are really stronger than ever.
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In addition, as East Asia has grown economically, I think it has come
together as a region. And so we are seeing expanding regional cooperation—
politically, economically and culturally—and through a number of institutions,
some of which we are members, some of which we are observers, and some of
which we, frankly, don’t know what to do with. But we have seen an ASEAN in
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and now, in the East Asia Summit, we
are seeing these countries come together in a way that I think could not have
been anticipated only a few years ago.
Finally, we see an East Asia that is really, largely, at peace. There has not
been a single major military conflict there for over 25 years, and we want to
keep it that way. We have to work very hard with a number of the countries
there. We need to be very engaged in the countries because ultimately, if we
ignore those places and step away, we will find that there are problems that
happen and the problems will leave us in a worse position because we will be
coming in late. So very much I think the Asia century is upon us and now, we
have to deal with this and make sure that we can be a part of this growth.
I would like to talk about the three main sub-regions—that is, Southeast
Asia, China and Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, we have some partners that
have done well. We continue to work very closely with Singapore; indeed, we
are treaty-allied with Singapore. But we are seeing some new partners that have
emerged recently, namely Vietnam. I was in Vietnam just a couple of weeks ago.
In fact, someone tonight came up to me and said, “You know, I cannot quite
get used to the idea of having a friendly relationship with Vietnam.” And my
response was, “Neither could I,” because for my generation, we look at Vietnam
as a country that, in many ways, destroyed or harmed our generation. And yet,
Vietnam is very much, very clearly, making the right decision. It is moving in
the right way; it is looking for ways—and has made a strategic decision—to
introduce a market economy. It wants to make the right decisions in making
sure that people have economic freedom. And I am convinced that it will also
make the decision on political freedom. So we are looking at a country that
only a few years ago seemed like another communist laggard that was unable to
move ahead, that was continuing to imprison people for their political views
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and their religious views, and now, we see a country that is really on the march,
and in many respects, it is a country that is really taxiing out to the runway to
be the next Asian country that takes off. And we want to be a part of that.
Vietnam has a big interest in keeping the U.S. engaged in Southeast Asia.
Vietnam, for reasons that go back centuries, does not want to see a Southeast
Asia where the only main player there, the only large country there, is China.
They want to see the U.S. also be a part of it. So when one goes to Vietnam,
one sits down and one has some serious discussions about how the U.S. can
be more engaged—what can we do to work with Vietnam, not only bilaterally,
but also in its status as a major member of the ASEAN countries? It is really
quite heartwarming to see this development, and we want to see it continue.
President Bush will be in Vietnam in November; I am hoping Secretary [of
State Condoleezza] Rice will be there some time in the summer. This will
be a real opportunity to continue this relationship, and in a way that will be
very surprising to the general public of the United States: that this country
which we are accustomed to seeing the word “war” come after Vietnam, is a
country that is really making the right decision. I think we can look back at the
sacrifice in this country—those 50-odd thousand names that are on that wall
in Washington—and realize that it was a sacrifice that I think led this country,
ultimately, in the right direction. So I think that is one of the most exciting
things going on in Southeast Asia.
Another, looking over on the other end of Southeast Asia, is Indonesia.
This is far and away the world’s largest Muslim population. It is a country of
some 225 million people, of whom some 90 percent are Muslim. It is very
important that we get this place right and that it do the right thing, because
if Indonesia is not successful in developing its civil society and developing its
democracy and developing its economy, we could have very serious problems
here for years to come. So there again, we work very hard bilaterally. In fact,
Secretary Rice will be going there in March, and we will continue to make sure
that Indonesia is heading in the right direction. Again, if that country of 220,
230 million people can succeed, I think it will be an example for many of the
Islamic states in the Middle East to take some heart that it can be done: you can
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have an Islamic state together with a market economy, together with democratic
institutions, and make it work.
So Vietnam and Indonesia are two countries we need to work very carefully
with. Thailand is also a very old friend, a very old ally, and there, too, we have
to continue to ensure that that is the case. Malaysia is a country with whom we
have had a very troubled relationship over the last 20 years, and now with new
leadership, it is clearly a country that we can have a good dialogue with. I was
just there some 12 days ago. We had very good discussions with the government
there; we have some real common endeavors—Malaysia is very interested in a
successful Middle East process. I think that is another country we can work
with. It is a smaller country than Indonesia—only some 20 million people—
but with a very large Muslim population. It is very much a Muslim country,
and I think there, too, we can have a relationship that will serve our interests
very well.

I think we can be encouraged by our ability to
have a strong dialogue with China.

that is something we are working very hard to develop.
We want to make sure that as we work in Southeast Asia, we do it in
a way that does not create a competition with the Chinese. We find that
with China, there is a host of misunderstandings on how we deal with these
countries, and in fact, in addition to the misunderstandings, we have some flatout disagreements with the Chinese. And so as we sit with the Chinese, we try
to work hard to identify where we disagree and to talk this through. We have a
new senior dialogue that has been under way in recent months under the aegis
of our Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick and his Chinese counterpart,
Dai Bingguo [Executive Vice Foreign Minister], and they work together and
work on the various issues that we need to have understanding with the Chinese.
For example, in Southeast Asia, there is the country Burma, and we do not see
much good coming out of Burma these days. It is a very repressive government,
a government that has really, I think, denied its people certain basic rights,
a government that has really failed to develop economically; and yet, we see
China increasingly working with Burma, buying up mineral resources in Burma
and otherwise creating a situation where no matter how tough our message is in
Burma, and no matter how tough the message is of the other ASEAN countries
to Burma, Burma is not listening. Burma is listening more to China. So we need
to have a conversation with the Chinese, and we are developing the ability to
have this type of conversation.

So, overall, in Southeast Asia, we see excellent bilateral relations developing;
but perhaps more importantly, we see these countries coming together as never
before in multilateral structures—through the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, through ASEAN—and there, too, we want to encourage this type
of ability to have multilateral structures. These are countries that have not
been used to that in the past, and so we want to work with these structures to
see what can be done to lower trade barriers, to ensure that ASEAN—which
together, those ten ASEAN countries comprise our fifth largest trading partner
in the world—that we can make sure our businesses feel that they can invest
there, that they have a home there, and those countries can also feel that they
can export to us and we can continue this very strong economic relationship. So

We are working very closely with the Chinese to ensure we do not have
misunderstandings on what China is doing in terms of buying oil capacity.
China is very active in East Africa, it is very active in Latin America, in terms
of gaining mineral rights. So we need to work with the Chinese, and we
are doing that. I think we can be encouraged by our ability to have a strong
dialogue with China. To be sure, China—which has a surplus with the United
States that is closing in on some $200 billion annually—is going to have to
understand that in developing the U.S. market, they need to develop it with
a sense of developing it in a sustainable way. China needs to understand that
when thousands of Americans are losing their jobs every year to restructuring,
to transformation in the economy, and frankly, to imports, that more and more,

34

35

Americans look at these difficult transformations and they blame China for
them. Even if you took away all the surplus that China has, you would still have
a rather substantial deficit with the rest of the world as well. So China needs
to understand that they are very much becoming the focus of the frustrations
of many Americans—at our inability to safeguard manufacturing jobs—and I
think China needs to develop a sustainable notion of our market. So that is an
enormous challenge when we deal with the Chinese.
Another enormous challenge that we have with them is dealing with
the human rights record. It is very clear that China has a different view of
how their political process is going to develop, and it is quite different from
ours, and quite different from many of our allies. So here, too, we have some
fundamental disagreements, but we have to keep talking to them; we have to be
engaged with them.
I would say one of the areas where we have been engaged—and I would say
fairly successfully engaged with the Chinese—is through something called the
Six-Party Talks, which I have been very much involved in with North Korea.
China understands that ultimately, if North Korea is to develop nuclear weapons
and is to develop a nuclear arsenal, that this will be absolutely unacceptable to
the United States. It is destabilizing in the region; the Chinese understand that.
It will cause other countries to be tempted to have nuclear weapons, and it
will create the prospect that North Korea, a country that has really not shown
any scruples about selling anything to anyone, could well proliferate nuclear
material. So I think China has some of the same concerns we do, and I think
it is important that China understands—and they do understand—what our
views are on that: that ultimately, we want to work with China through the SixParty process—that is, a process that involves China, the United States, South
Korea, Japan and Russia; a process that basically says the North Korean nuclear
issue is not just a U.S. problem, but rather a problem for the entire region.
We work day and night with the Chinese, who are the host of this process,
to see if we can get to the point where the North Koreans will understand
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there is no choice but to give up these weapons. We have, together with the
Chinese and the other partners, put on the table, I think, a pretty good proposal
to the North Koreans. It is a proposal whose central feature is to say to the
North Koreans that if you give up your nuclear ambitions, we will show you an
open road to international recognition, international integration. The concern
we have is whether that is in fact what the North Koreans want, because the
North Koreans have traditionally used not only this belligerence in developing
a nuclear weapons capability, but also a sense that somehow their country is
surrounded by enemies and what is safe for North Korea is to be isolated. So
the concern is whether what we are offering them is in fact what they want.
So we are working very hard on this with our partners. As you may know,
we reached an agreement in September with the six parties—the first time
we reached any kind of agreement among the six parties, the first time the
six parties agreed on a single piece of paper—which was that in a list of
principles, North Korea is willing to give up its weapons, and give up all of
its nuclear programs; and by the way, that does not just mean weapons-related
programs because if we agreed only to weapons-related programs, we would get
into protracted arguments about which nuclear program involves weapons, and
which involves something else, so what they agreed to was all nuclear programs.
And now we come to the real hard part which is to sit down and figure out how
to implement that.

fund the process of dismantling the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, a graphitemoderated reactor that was originally purchased from the Soviet Union starting
in the 1950s. It is going to take some time because the answer to the question
of how to take apart a nuclear reactor is “slowly.” You don’t just take a wrecking
ball to it, so this is a process that will take some years.
But if we can get there and then begin a process of offering economic
assistance through international financial institutions and otherwise bringing
North Korea into the world—North Korea is a country of some 20 million
people, it is a country that has really been left to the side in international
development, especially development in Northeast Asia; it is truly a tragic
situation. It is a government that has failed miserably to meet its people’s needs.
And if anyone thought there was any competition between North Korea and
South Korea, well, that is long ago over. In the 1960s, North Korea had per
capita incomes that were higher than South Korea; today, North Korea’s per
capita incomes are something like one-thirtieth of those of South Korea. It is
over as far as competition. The only question is how to deal with the situation,
how to get them out of the nuclear business, and how to get them started in
the right direction. This is a problem of great trauma to the South Koreans,
obviously, because for many South Koreans it is a very difficult proposition
on how to integrate North Korea. After all, they looked at the experience in
Germany, an experience where East Germany had some one-third per capita
income, rather than one-thirtieth—they do not want to have a situation where
they have 20 million North Koreans show up at their doorstep, resulting in the
impoverishment of South Korea.

We are going to have to work very hard with our partners to get the
North Koreans to agree to a declaration of what precisely they have, and it is
a declaration we want to work with them on—that is, we do not want them
to give us a piece of paper which is wholly inadequate and then declare the
whole process void. We want to make sure that when they put their declaration
on the table, it is a complete declaration and it acknowledges all of their
nuclear programs. And we have real agreement from the Chinese and the other
partners on this. And when we get that declaration, then we would look for a
dismantlement effort; we would look to identify U.S. funds and other funds
that would fund the process of taking nuclear materials out of the country,

At the same time, for the South Koreans it is a deeply emotional issue.
You know, the Chinese often talk about the fact that they have been divided
from Taiwan, and this happened during what the Chinese refer to as a “century
of shame,” and how difficult this is for the Chinese—that they do not have
sovereignty, or they do not have control of Taiwan. But imagine for China, or
anyone else, to have a demilitarized zone running across the central spine of the
country. Imagine the difficultly that any country would have with this situation,
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and that is what you see in South Korea. For South Koreans, it is something
that is just hard to get over what happened during their century of weakness,
and what happened when lines were drawn by foreigners, where Russian troops
took the surrender of the Japanese north of the 38th parallel, U.S. troops took
the surrender of the Japanese south of the 38th parallel, and before you knew
it, the 38th parallel has endured as an international border ever since. With that
in mind, the South Koreans react with great sensitivity to how the U.S. deals
with the problem of North Korea.
To be sure, we have a particular issue—that is, the nuclear issue: we cannot
allow North Korea to be building these nuclear weapons. It is truly destabilizing
to the region; it is truly affecting our interests. We cannot have a situation
where North Korea can conceivably proliferate these materials as they have
done in many other materials; we need to guard against proliferating to other
states that are seeking to develop nuclear weapons or to terrorist groups; but
we need to give attention to the deep emotional feeling of the South Koreans
with respect to the peninsula issues. We need to understand that this is a deeply
troubling issue for the South Koreans. We need to work with them very hard.
Finally, let me say that with respect to our relationships in the Pacific—
that is, with Japan and moving south to Australia—we have excellent relations
with both those countries. Japan is the world’s second largest economy; it is
still a force to be reckoned with, even though it is making room in the region
for China, now the world’s fifth largest economy. But Japan is a country that we
work with very closely, not so much in Asia, not so much in the neighborhood
there in Asia, but in many other places. Japan is the second largest donor in
the United Nations. It is a very serious player in the United Nations, and for
this reason, Japan has been very interested in gaining a seat in the Security
Council, and we have supported that aspiration for a seat in the Security
Council. Japan does take a great burden in underdeveloped countries; it has
assumed a burden in the Middle East in terms of providing assistance there.
Japan has been helpful to us in Iraq and elsewhere, and so we stay in very close
contact with the Japanese. And for that reason, we have a strategic dialogue with
Japan and Australia.
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When some people see the U.S., Japan and Australia working together and
dealing with strategic issues, they think that this is somehow some effort to
contain China. This is not the purpose of the strategic dialogue. We want to
be able to talk to Japan and Australia, like-minded states, about problems the
world over. We want both of those countries, especially Japan, to have a good
relationship with China because the current situation where Japan and China
are at loggerheads over historical issues is not helpful to us and certainly not
helpful to them. So we encourage Japan to figure out how to do better with its
neighbors in Northeast Asia, especially China, but also South Korea. And we
feel if we can get there and see some improvement there, we can see that Japan
will be able to play a greater and even more positive role in the region.

…we cannot allow North Korea to be building
these nuclear weapons. It is truly destabilizing to the region;
it is truly affecting our interests.

I would just like to mention one other issue that as I went through this
geographic swath, I skipped, which was Taiwan. Taiwan is a country that we do
not recognize as a sovereign state. It has some 20 million people. It is a pretty
big economic player, but it is the view, the policy of the United States, that
there is but one China. But we maintain relations with the people of Taiwan,
but what we especially need from Taiwan and China is to resolve their issue
through peaceful means. When we hear the Chinese in some way reserving the
right to use force in Taiwan, we are clearly long past the time when force could
ever be considered. There is more Taiwan investment in places like Shanghai
than there is of any other foreign country in that coastal part of China. It is
simply unacceptable for people to be talking about using force. So what we
look for from the Chinese is to reach out and talk with the Taiwanese.
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I must say, it was a little discouraging just the other day—I was in
Washington on Tuesday [24 January 2006] and I met with the head of the
Taiwan National Assembly—to get the kind of criticism we were getting from
the Chinese about meeting with these people. China remains extremely sensitive
about U.S. contacts with Taiwan, even though we have made abundantly clear
to the Chinese on numerous occasions that we do support the one China policy.
So we want to see some resolution of that issue. We are not going to get in the
middle of it; we are going to expect Taiwan and China to try to resolve that.
There have been some positive trends. China did pull away from a resolution
by the People’s Assembly last spring that certainly added some fuel to the fire.4
They have also restarted flights so that Chinese tourists and Taiwanese tourists
can go and visit the sites, so there is some encouragement there, but I think a
lot more needs to be done.
Finally, let me say the U.S. maintains—really keeps the peace—in East
Asia. We have a huge navy still based out of Pearl Harbor, out of Hawaii;
we have a very active Pacific Command there. We maintain bilateral relations,
and what we are trying to do with these bilateral military relations is to try
to assist and work together with countries more multilaterally through the
security area. So it is a very active portfolio. I often joke to people that I went
from being Ambassador to South Korea to being Assistant Secretary of North
Korea, since I spend so much time on the North Koreans; but I think, in fact,
we have interests well beyond the North Korean issue. We have interests, as I
said, throughout Southeast Asia and especially in China, and I think we will be
able to cover all our bases there.

4 In March of 2005, the National People’s Assembly of China passed a resolution known as the Anti-Secession Law,
which formalized China’s policy against the secession of Taiwan, and outlined steps that would lead to “non-peaceful
means” China would take if there is no longer any hope of reunification.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Questions were submitted by the audience and read by Dr. Joyce Neu, Executive
Director of the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
JN: We’ll take some questions from the audience.

CH: Hun Sen, too.
JN: Hun Sen in Cambodia. So I wonder whether you could address this
issue of the psychology of leaders and how one develops relationships and
is able to talk to them.

CH: So are these all censored questions?
JN: Absolutely, they go through Washington first—slight delay. [laughter]
Audience member: What about Hong Kong?
JN: Do you want to deal with that?
CH: Sure. Yes. The concern we have with Hong Kong is to make sure that
we see a widening of the franchise for people living in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong is probably the freest economy in the world; it continues to be. But
we’re concerned whether the Hong Kong people support the way that the
administrator for Hong Kong is determined by Beijing. What they have is
basically a system of electors, and we’d like to see that system expanded. The
Chinese authorities have proposed an expansion, but it doesn’t go as far as
many people in Hong Kong feel it should go. So again, we support resolving
that issue through dialogue. I was in Hong Kong a few months ago, and it is
about as vibrant a city as you’ll ever see. A lot of the predictions of Hong
Kong’s demise have been truly misplaced.
JN: One of the issues of concern for many people with North Korea is
Kim Jong-Il, and his portrayal as someone who is beyond the bounds of
being able to negotiate with, someone who may be crazy, someone who is
rather fanatic. You have had a great deal of experience with people like
this, I think, with the [Radovan] Karadzics of the world, with the [Ratko]
Mladics, with [Slobodan] Milosevic, and in Albania.
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CH: Yes. I haven’t met Kim Jong-Il yet, and in fact, our direct contact with
the North Koreans has been fairly limited. One of the reasons is they flatout lied to us in the late 1990s because they denied having a highly-enriched
uranium program, which is the other way to produce nuclear weapons besides
the one they have acknowledged, which is plutonium. And so, since they lied
to us—rather directly—we have preferred to have our contacts in a multilateral
way. So while I’ve had bilateral meetings with the North Koreans, I do it in the
context of the Six-Party Talks. One of the reasons is the North Koreans would
prefer just to talk to the U.S. and cut everyone else out, and that’s not how we
think this problem can be solved.
But with respect to Kim Jong-Il’s psychology, I’ve got to tell you, every time
someone tells me so-and-so is nuts, and then I go meet the guy, you know, I
just don’t find those clinical assessments to be terribly helpful or even accurate.
Usually there’s a logic there and you try to figure out what it is. I think Kim
Jong-Il is very concerned about retaining power, and so how he goes about that
may not be the best thing for the North Korean economy, but actually it may
be the best thing for keeping him in power. I’m reluctant to go with the idea
that he’s got some mental problem. Sometimes I feel like I do after talking to
him. [laughter]
JN: It’s sometimes an easy way, I think, to get around dealing with people.
A question from the audience: what will be or should be a next U.S. policy
toward political reform in Burma after pushing the issue through the U.N.
Security Council and ASEAN countries?
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CH: This is a very frustrating problem in Burma. We did push this problem
up to the Security Council, not to get any resolution on it—because we
could not get a resolution because there are a number of countries in the
Security Council that did not support that—but at least for the first time,
Security Council members received a briefing from the U.N. representative
on Burma to see precisely what the situation is. It’s clearly going in the wrong
direction—we have very limited ability to affect the junta there. We believe
that part of the problem is that, while he gets a tough message from us, he gets
a different message from some other partners. For example, the Chinese have
been very engaged in Burma; economically, they’re very interested in buying
up mining capacity in Burma. What we need to do is make sure that we have
some agreement with the Chinese, Indians, and in fact, Japanese, as well as
the ASEAN states, on how we deal with Burma because if we just rail away
at Burma and don’t work it out with these other partners, I don’t think we’re
going to get very far.
We’ve had some, I think, improvement on how the ASEAN states are handling
Burma. For example, the Malaysian Foreign Minister [Syed] Hamid [Albar]
has made very clear—Malaysia is this year’s Chairman of ASEAN—he wants
to visit Burma, the Burmese have invited him, but he will only go if they allow
him to see Madam Aung San Suu Kyi.5 That’s something the Burmese have
refused to allow anybody to do lately, so he’s been pretty tough on that. I think
we have a pretty good understanding with the ASEAN states, but I am worried
about how the Chinese perceive it. And of course, the Indians are concerned
that Burma is tilting too much to the Chinese orbit, so the Indians are engaged
there. I think what’s important to understand is while we in the United States
tend to look at Burma as a human rights issue, countries in the region look at
it as a human rights issue, but also as a strategic issue. So countries are worried
about which way it is tilting, and for that reason they want to keep more
contact with Burma than we’ve wanted to do.
JN: Thank you. We have two questions relating to China. With the looming
global peak in oil production, how concerning is China’s massive stockpiling

of raw materials like concrete, copper, steel, oil, etc., and their numerous
military pacts with countries like Russia and Iran? And somewhat related
is how long can China continue to develop economically without political
freedoms?
CH: I think what is most worrisome about China’s military budget is not
so much how large the budget is because, frankly speaking, the U.S.’ budget
is, by several factors, far greater than China. What is worrisome is we really
don’t know. China doesn’t publish their budget; they’re not open; there’s no
transparency; there’s no debate. So you don’t really know what’s going on in
the Chinese military budget. And generally, China is very careful about state
secrets, and in fact, they’ll prosecute their people whenever they believe some
government official has given out a state secret; you’ll find the guy hauled into
court, and these are pretty serious charges. So China is not open with respect
to these issues. It is open with respect to foreign investment; it’s not open with
respect to these issues of budget and other accoutrements of a democracy.
Clearly, with respect to that, China is a work in progress.
As to how it can continue to go with its current political system, it’s hard to say
because China has some serious problems domestically in terms of a growing
income disparity—they’re very concerned that people in the rural areas are
feeling that the people in the urban areas are enjoying all the growth—so there
are a lot of tensions in China. A lot of what we see in China is not so much
attitudes to us or attitudes to foreigners, but rather, an effort to manage this
growing divide between rural and urban. Ultimately, China has to deal with
those problems. Although the Chinese middle class has grown enormously,
they still have 200 million people living on a dollar a day. What would be
interesting to see is to compare China with what is going on in India, which
does have a democracy and which is beginning to grow at growth rates that are
pretty close to those of China. I think it is quite likely that India could actually
step up growth rates, and India could be poised to actually grow faster and to
ultimately be bigger than China. I think when those trends become clear, China
will have to look at the issue of political reform.

5 Aung San Suu Kyi is the leader of the National League for Democracy, the leading opposition party to the ruling
military junta in Burma. She has been under house arrest since 2003. She won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.
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JN: We have quite a few questions on North Korea, as you might imagine.
CH: I hope there are some ideas, too. [laughter]
JN: I don’t see any policies or strategies here, but maybe. The BBC
characterized your approach to North Korea in terms of negotiation, and
contrasted your style with Mr. [Dick] Cheney and Mr. [Donald] Rumsfeld,
whose style appears to be more confrontational. If this is so, how do you
deal with these kinds of differences? This is off the record. [laughter]
CH: This isn’t off the record. [laughter] I think your best diplomacy should
be reserved for dealing at home. [laughter] To be sure, people in Washington
are not always one big happy family, and we have to deal with differences from
time to time. But I feel that I have had a tremendous amount of support for
how I’ve been dealing with the North Koreans. I’ve been especially gratified
with how my boss, Secretary Rice, has sent me out with guidance that is really
adequate. You know, when you’re a negotiator and you’re going out there and
you get guidance that doesn’t allow you to do your job, you know, you shouldn’t
go out there. And I’ve always gotten guidance that does allow me to do my
job.

JN: This is kind of a similar question and I don’t know if you want to
address it any further, but how are relations between [the Departments
of] State and Defense these days on issues such as North Korea, Taiwan,
China, and the situation in Indonesia? Whose influence is paramount with
the president?
CH: I think, you know, with respect to Indonesia, everyone’s on the same
page. We really want to work with the Indonesians. They’ve come a long way,
as President [Susilo Bambang] Yudhoyono has been doing the right thing.
They have pursued some of the abuses by the Indonesian military and actually
made some arrests. So we’re pretty much OK in Washington on that. Again, in
Taiwan, everyone wants that situation calmed down. We don’t want a situation
where the Chinese are rattling sabers in Taiwan. I think also there is a sense that
the Taiwanese need to look at their military budgets because Taiwan right now
is spending far less on its military, in per capita terms, than the United States
is. This is something that is noticed by a lot of different offices and places in
Washington. When I met with the Taiwan head of the National Assembly, I
had on one side a guy from the NSC [National Security Council], and on the
other side, a general from the office of the Secretary of Defense, so you know,
I think we’re OK on Taiwan.

So there are some people that find it more distasteful than others. When I was
dealing with Milosevic, I didn’t deal with Milosevic because I liked him; I dealt
with Milosevic because we had to deal with him because he was in power and
we had to deal with a tough situation. And so, I think people understand that
when you sit down with North Koreans, probably the best way to handle it
is not to be angry; sorrow rather than anger is usually the way to go, and just
to try to look at these problems more from, sort of a way of, let’s solve the
equation, let’s figure out what can be done. I do believe that what we came up
with in September in this statement of principles is a deal that is good for us
and good for the North Koreans. So I think it can be done. If people want to
do a lot of moral posturing on it and rail away at them, that’s fine, but we’ve
got a problem there that needs to be solved, and to solve a problem you need
to have some problem-solving skills. And so the way you do that is you’ve got
to sit down and listen and talk. I’m OK with that, and if I’m not OK, I won’t
be doing it.

With Korea, I think we’re OK in the negotiating, but what will be very
interesting is when we get to the point where we actually have to implement
the thing because we’ll have some doubting Thomases there who will expect a
wholesale disrobing by the North Koreans. And then we’ll have some problems
because the North Koreans won’t want to do that, so we could have some interagency problems. But when I go out to negotiate with the North Koreans, I do
so with an inter-agency group. The other agencies are not there just to tattletale on me, they’re there actually to participate in the process, and I think we’re
basically OK. We don’t see eye to eye on everything, but it’s all right.
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Did I cover all the countries? China? You know, Secretary Rumsfeld went
there and was kind of struck by what’s going on in China, and so he’s been
very encouraging to Admiral [William] Fallon, the Pacific Commander, to be
engaged and maybe to resurrect some of our military-to-military contacts,

which have atrophied in recent years. So I think there’s a growing understanding
among everybody that we need a strategy that engages China and that helps
shape the environment for China’s rise, because China is rising; it is a very
serious player. I like to think that we don’t have any plans to go to war with
Wal-Mart’s leading supplier. [laughter] We may go to war with Wal-Mart, but
not with their leading supplier. I really like to think that we can figure out a
way forward. China needs us, and last time I checked in a furniture store, we
need China.
JN: Are you proposing a new theory to follow on the McDonald’s theory,
that countries with McDonald’s don’t go to war with each other? Now we
have the Wal-Mart theory?

CH: There was a McDonald’s in Belgrade, actually. I remember it very well.
JN: Well, that disproves that theory, I think. When has diplomacy ever
convinced a nuclear country to give up its weapons?
CH: Well, actually, the combination of coercive diplomacy—that is, sanctions—
certainly convinced South Africa to do it. A number of the countries of the
former Soviet Union were kind of interested in maybe holding on to those
weapons, and we made abundantly clear that countries like Kazakhstan and
Ukraine were not going to be able to hold on to old Soviet nuclear material. So
I think diplomacy has a pretty good record of convincing countries to give up
their weapons. The problem we have in North Korea—if you look at North
Korea’s top thousand problems, I can’t see how a nuclear weapon is going to
solve any of them—but the problem is, I don’t think Kim Jong-Il cares about
the top thousand problems that North Korea has, and he may have some
misplaced notion of what nuclear weapons can do for North Korea’s prestige,
or for somehow threatening their neighbors into giving them extra assistance
or something.
So the real problem you have with these leaders like that is what is our track
record for getting a guy like Kim Jong-Il to give up nuclear weapons? I don’t
think it’s clear what the outcome is going to be on this. I’m not prepared to
say he’s definitely going to give up his weapons, but I’m also not prepared to
say he’s definitely not going to give up his weapons. I mean, I’m always amazed
to sit in meetings in Washington and have these bold-faced assertions that he
will never give up his weapons. Well, how do you know that? And if that’s your
conviction, what are you suggesting? Should we be sending the National Guard
to North Korea? I mean, what are we going to do?
So I think what’s important is to work with our partners here, and if we come
to the end of the road and there’s simply no way forward, I’d like the Chinese
to come to that conclusion, the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Russians—I’d
like everyone to come to that conclusion together, and then we’ll think of
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something else. We’ve got a lot of options to deal with that problem, but the
one option we don’t have is to walk away from it. I think it’s very important to
stick with this diplomacy. People who are down on it are never able to answer
the question, “Then what would you do?” because they usually change the
subject.
JN: Is it realistic to be concerned about a possible alliance of North Korea
and Iran, with perhaps other regimes that are hostile to the United States?
And if so, what can we do to address this?
CH: We’ve got to see what goes on between North Korea and Iran; we track
that stuff pretty carefully, and we need to make sure these guys are not
exchanging technologies. You know, I think when you look at the size and the
importance of the United States, of China, of Russia—you know, if we can’t
handle North Korea and Iran, I think we’re in the wrong line of work. I think
we can deal with it. What we don’t want is a situation where countries out there
think it’s OK for North Korea and Iran to be exchanging technologies. I think
what we need to do is build alliances, build relations with other states so that
they have the same view as we do, which is that it’s unacceptable for Iran to be
giving them nuclear assistance, or for North Korea to be giving Iran nuclear
assistance or assistance with ballistic missiles, which is what North Korea
tends to be good at. So I think, again, it’s very important to have countries
realize we are doing all we can through diplomacy, but we need some help from
there. We can’t have a situation where Iranian airplanes are able to fly over a
number of countries in order to bring materials to or get materials from North
Korea. We need help from other countries; but the way to do that is to show
those other countries that we’re engaged and we’re doing all that we can on
the diplomatic track.
JN: Thank you. How are the human rights violations in North Korea being
addressed in the Six-Party Talks?

international community, you’ve got to buy a ticket. And part of the price of
the ticket is going to be that your human rights record is going to get looked
at. I’ve used that metaphor of buying a ticket—I’m not sure he understood it,
so I tried ration card, and he still didn’t understand it, but anyway—I made the
point that this is what happens when you’re in the international community.
Everyone takes a few hits; everyone gets criticized; and the way to handle it
is just to get used to it. I told him even the U.S. takes a few hits on human
rights—it just happens. For them to think that there should be some North
Korean exceptionalism—that is, North Korea should be treated differently
from everyone else in the world—is simply not a sustainable policy. So I have
absolutely raised that in the Six-Party Talks.
Now interestingly, the North Koreans kind of sat there; they didn’t enjoy it,
but they took notes—they’re great note-takers—and it was interesting because
some of my partners were saying, “Oh my goodness, don’t raise that. We’ve got
enough problems with nuclear weapons.” I don’t believe they’re in conflict: I
really think we can, just as a matter of fact, explain to the North Koreans—as
I’ve done—what they’re going to have to do, what sort of hoops they’re going
to have to go through to be a member in good standing in the international
community. And by the way, North Korea has a terrible human rights record,
but you know, there are countries out there that also have bad human rights
records. So we’re not looking for that place to become Switzerland overnight;
you know, we understand it will take some time, but they’re just going to have
to get used to it.
JN: I wonder what impact the challenges to the human rights record of the
United States has in talking to other countries about human rights. Do you
find with some of the problems the U.S. is experiencing with criticism of
our observance of human rights in this country that that is, at any level,
affecting your ability to talk human rights to other countries?
CH: You mean Abu Ghraib and that sort of thing?

CH: If at all. A little editorial comment there, I think. You know, I made very
clear to the North Koreans at the Six-Party Talks that if you want to join the
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JN: Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, yes?
CH: Well, I think it’s just best to deal with it very honestly. Don’t be defensive
about it, just lay it out. I think what’s important is that these things happen—
they’re terrible things, they’re shameful things—but they get investigated,
people get hauled up in front of military tribunals, they get sentenced, and we
deal with them. I think for us to get defensive and start saying, “How can you
raise that when you have a lot?” I think we just need to be very honest about it.
I do it with a certain pace in my voice because I want them to know that I’m
upset about it, too. But I’m also pretty proud that our country can deal with
that and deal with it lawfully and move on to the next problem.
JN: How can the U.S. insist on another country divesting itself of nuclear
capacity while continuing to test nuclear weapons? What is the credibility
of the U.S. in light of selling weapons worldwide?
CH: Well, we don’t test nuclear weapons. We’ve observed a test ban for a
number of years.6 Funny, this question, because I was so pleased when we got
that September agreement in Beijing, and I was on the phone a lot with people
in Washington, some of whom contained their enthusiasm for the agreement,
but nonetheless, I was pretty happy about it. I got onto the flight back to the
States around 5:00: We finished the deal around 1:00, and I had a couple of
press things, and I rushed out to the airport in Beijing, got on the flight, and
the flight attendant—I took business class, I confess—gave me one of those
little plastic glasses with champagne in it, so I thought, well, this is OK. Then
she said, “I have a question.” And I thought, “Chicken or beef ?” [laughter]
And she said, “How can we insist that a country give up its nuclear weapons
when we won’t give up our nuclear weapons?” I kind of looked at her, took
the champagne and tried to explain that—although I wasn’t in the mood—you
know, nuclear weapons in the hands of the North Koreans, I’m sorry to say,
is like giving a child a carving knife. It is really very dangerous. This is not a
country that should be anywhere near nuclear weapons.

I, like most people in the world, am very upset that over the course of history,
a nuclear arms race developed, that we have thousands of them, that Russia
has thousands of them—I mean, I’m not happy about it. It happened; we
have systems for dealing with it; we have systems for reducing the number
of weapons; we have negotiations for reducing them. We are really handling
it in a way that has made the situation more stable and ultimately, the world
more safe. But to suggest that the solution to the fact that we continue to have
nuclear weapons, which are really a holdover from the Cold War, that that is an
excuse to allow a country like North Korea, which does not have paved roads,
which does not have health stations, schools, heat for the schools—I mean,
trucks going on North Korean roads, they don’t have gasoline engines for the
trucks, they put wood into this cavity that allows the truck to go—I mean, that
is not a country that should be developing nuclear weapons. So that’s what I
told the flight attendant. And then I ordered the chicken. [laughter]
JN: This is a somewhat related question, related to the development of
nuclear power as opposed to nuclear weapons.
CH: This actually was a big issue because the North Koreans said they wanted
something called a light-water reactor. A light-water reactor is a nuclear power
station where there is less of a chance of diverting fuel to make weapons. This
was part of the Clinton administration’s effort to deal with the problem—that
is, they would provide a couple of light-water reactors and as a result, the
North Koreans would do away with these very dangerous type of reactors,
so-called graphite-moderated reactors. Our point to the North Koreans, and
the point that the other four partners made to the North Koreans, was that if
you want to develop nuclear energy in the future, you’ve got to do a few things.
You’ve got to, first of all, get rid of the stuff you have right now because the
North Koreans admitted to us that all of their nuclear programs are, in fact,
weapons-related. And so, they admitted that anything they’ve got now is not
for peaceful nuclear use, it’s for weapons. So get rid of all that. Get back into
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Remember—they were the first country ever

6 The Partial Test Ban Treaty has been in force since 1963.
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to do this—they pulled themselves out of the Treaty, and then they started
harvesting the plutonium from this Yongbyon reactor. So get back in the NonProliferation Treaty; come into compliance with the so-called safeguards of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA; develop a clean record in
terms of not selling stuff to nasty people; after that, we’re prepared to discuss
the subject of a provision of a light-water reactor.

to see that Korea has become the tenth largest industrial country in the world
(when our troops were there in 1960, Korea had the per capital income of a
country like Ghana) for Americans to see what that country has done, they can
be very proud of their service. So we’ll pull them out when it’s in our country’s
interest to pull them out, and when it’s in the interest of stability and peace
to pull them out.

If North Korea were a stable, democratically-inclined country that didn’t try
to develop nuclear weapons, including clandestine development of nuclear
weapons through this program of importing stuff from the A.Q. Khan
network, this arms smuggler, this nuclear weapons smuggler from Pakistan—if
they hadn’t done all of that, you know, one could really talk about peaceful
use of nuclear energy. But what they need to do is come into compliance. We
have agreed that once they do that, we and the other partners will talk to them
about this peaceful use.

JN: I have two final questions. Do we need a Department of Peace and what
could it do that the State Department does not do?

JN: Why do we not pull out U.S. troops from Korea and Japan?
CH: Because to pull out U.S. troops from Korea and Japan could be
destabilizing. We can be very proud of what our U.S. troops have done in both
Korea and Japan. I mean, those countries have been able to develop in peace and
to develop to be, I think, a couple of very important allies. I’m not saying U.S.
troops are going to be there for the rest of time, but right now, the U.S. troops
are there, and are there for our interests, not just [for] the Japanese and the
Koreans. It is important for our country that they’re there. I think when there
is movement—in fact, we’ve reduced our forces from some 45,000 in South
Korea and it’s going down to 29,000—we can come out of South Korea or
come out of Japan in a way that we can all feel very proud of what our troops
have done there over the decades.

CH: I do that. [laughter]
JN: Are you the department?
CH: Look, we want peace. Could it do something the State does not do? No, we
do that. I mean, that’s our job, we try to keep the peace. We have no interest in
conflict. To have the strong bilateral relations, to encourage countries to work
together—frankly, no country does it better than our country. I think we’ve
been very important in heading off conflicts and we need more people involved
in that line of work, and that’s why I’m very pleased that the University of
San Diego is doing its part. It’s often thankless. I mean, you have people out in
Nepal—who thinks about Nepal these days? Very few people. The American
general public is probably not aware of what’s going on in Nepal, and you’re
out there with people. And by the way, we’ve got an embassy out there: we’ve
got political officers working these issues. It’s tough work. I mean, “blessed
are the peacemakers” because they take a lot of grief, believe me. So it’s very
tough work. We are totally engaged, and I’m not sure what a Department of
Peace could add to it.

Having been Ambassador in Korea and having met Americans who served in
Korea and the Korean War, or served in that, sort of, long and bitter peace in
the 1960s—for them to come back and to see what has happened in Seoul, and

JN: Thank you. The question comes from some of the students in the
audience and it says, a number of us here this evening are students from
the law school, but I’m sure there are students from other schools and
the college as well, and they are interested in careers in diplomacy or
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international relations. What advice can you offer to someone trying to get
started in the field?
CH: Well, first of all, read a daily newspaper. I mean, really know what’s going
on in the world. But also, at the State Department we’re looking for wellrounded people, so don’t just read the international section of the newspaper,
read the culture section. I mean, read the sports page.
JN: Lacrosse?
CH: Read about lacrosse. Play lacrosse. The point is we’re looking for wellrounded people who can really represent America abroad. We don’t want just
international relations people, we want people who really understand what our
country is, the values we represent, the diversity we represent. And then sign
up for the Foreign Service Exam. It’s free. It doesn’t cost a nickel. It’s a little
humiliating when you don’t pass, and by the way, I didn’t pass the first time
either. It’s a tough exam, but stick with it if you really want to get in. Most
people don’t pass the first time, so don’t be discouraged about that. I would
encourage that even if, ultimately, the Foreign Service isn’t for you, there are a
lot of other areas of public service that can get you out in the international
community: the Agency for International Development [USAID] is a great
career opportunity, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]—some of the most
intrepid colleagues I’ve had were actually from the CIA. It’s taken a lot of
lumps lately, but believe me, it is a proud organization. I think there are a lot of
things. And of course, the U.S. military. We know about deployments in places
like Iraq and Afghanistan, but do you realize the U.S. military is probably in
most countries in the world? We have defense attaches in every embassy; they
have done so much. If you look at our assistance in the tsunami areas—down
in Indonesia—there is a huge sea change, if you will, in our relations with
those countries—that was spearheaded by the U.S. military. The U.S. military,
frankly speaking, has some of our best peace officers.
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guests, including Nobel Peace Laureates and former Presidents Jimmy Carter
and Oscar Arias, Supreme Court justices, United Nations and United States
government officials, as well as ambassadors from countries around the world. In
1996, the university hosted a Presidential Debate between candidates Bill Clinton
and Bob Dole.
The USD campus, considered one of the most architecturally unique in
the nation, is known as Alcalá Park. Like the city of San Diego, the campus
takes its name from San Diego de Alcalá, a Franciscan brother who served as
the infirmarian at Alcalá de Henares, a monastery near Madrid, Spain. The
Spanish Renaissance architecture that characterizes the five-century old University
of Alcalá serves as the inspiration for the buildings on the University of San
Diego campus. The architecture was intended by the founders, Bishop Charles
Francis Buddy and Mother Rosalie Hill, to enhance the search for truth through
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